Med avseende på ett och annat som Antropofagi spekulativt framkastade i detta inlägg; ett antal av dessa spekulationer återkommer i Schellings verk.
Men, först: Även Friedmans grundtes är ju uttryckligen uttryckt av Schelling själv:
Vidare kan Antropofagis rantande om Jungs arketyper med lite god vilja skönjas en parallell till i det nedanstående:
Kanske framförallt MM:s poäng, att kategorierna man lanserar blir Schelling-punkter. Dvs., som Schelling poängterar, ligger makten i att generera Schelling-punkterna - när the tacit coordination väl är å färde, är det de befintliga punkterna som gäller.
T.ex. binder den här artikeln ihop Durkheim med Jung, och roller med arketyper - och detta, till på köpet, i anslutning till det intersubjektiva fenomenet religion. Artikeln knyter ann till Schelling såtillvida att man talar om interdependens, vilket är ett begrepp som Schelling själv ägnar en fotnot åt och som väl beskriver det icke-statiska i tacit (ungefär "tysta", "icke-kommunikativa") coordination games. (Det icke-statiska = att det vi tror att mot/medspelaren tror att vi tror att den tror etcetera in absurdum, är det som spelar roll - inget axiom att stå på, ingen fast mark - interdependensen är intersubjektiv - nätet har inget fästa i världen, men existerar som ett nät. Relativism.) Greenwood:
"Religion is a prevalent theme in the works of both Emile Durkheim and C. G. Jung, who participated in a common intellectual milieu. A comparison of Durkheim’s collective consciousness and Jung’s collective unconscious reveals strikingly similar concepts. The components of these structures, collective representations and archetypes, illustrate interdependent sociological and psychological processes in the theorized creation of religious phenomena. An analysis of the constitutive elements in these processes offers a basis for structuring a transpersonal sociology of religion."
Vi kanske närmar oss en syntetisering här, där Schellings coordination games helt enkelt bara beskriver interdependensen som Jung benämner "kollektivt undermedvetet". För att tala kontemporär (=töntig) svenska, så kanske vi snickrar på samma problem med tre olika verktygslådor: Schellings, Houellebecq/Hararis, och Jungs.
Och tilliten är där också - dvs. vårt Trädgårdhska/Rothsteinska mått på benägenhet att spela plussummespel, eller för att tala med Schelling, vår förmåga att spela tysta koordinations-spel.
Slutligen slängde Antropofagi ur sig en killgissning om guldets funktion som Schelling-punkt - och faktum är att Schelling själv är inne och nosar på denna möjlighet.
Schelling-punktens myckna tillämpbarhet får mig att ta ett steg tillbaka och dra ett djupt andetag. Min hjärna har på slentrian behandlat Schellings poänger som vad jag i brist på bättre term vill kalla ny materia; som om nya territorier i verkligheten har tillgängliggjorts. Men, det som egentligen har hänt är naturligtvis bara att jag har fått nya teoretiska verktyg - ovanligt stringenta, måste erkännas - och således kunnat betrakta samma gamla skitta verklighet ur ett nytt perspektiv. Det är givetvis därför allting känns som wow-nytt - för att jag ser det ur en wow-ny vinkel.
Att Schellings idéer visar sig vara så brett tillämpliga kan givetvis bero på min mönstersökande hjärna, som nu så att fått en ny ansiktsmall att se i melerade kakelplattor och mögliga dasstapeter. Men ack, de framträder i alla fall, ansiktena.
Att världen då kan beskrivas ur så väsensskilda perspektiv, får mig att drömma The story of your Life and others-drömmar. Kan jag, eller kan mänskligheten, ha så olika perspektiv - hur sjuk kan då utomjordningar betrakta ett fenomen?
Återigen - poäng till postmodernismen. Perspektivet är mycket.
Samtidigt ska vi inte blunda för att varje modell bidrar med någonting; i Schelling-fallet en teknisk förståelse för själv mekanismen i de kollektiva, intersubjektiva, interdependenta processerna. Och som kausala realister är det ju inte minst mekanismer vi intresserar oss för.
***
Åter till Jung och Durkheim, som får avsluta det här via Greenwood (jag har plockat bort alla referenser och sidhänvisningar) (tänk på Houellebecq/Hararis intersubjektiva fenomen, och Schellings tacit coordination-games medan du läser):
"Durkheim’s first methodological rule suggests that we 'treat social facts as things'. In other words, as Pickering has noted, the sacred as social fact is a thing-in-itself, but it always appears as a representation symbolizing an underlying reality. Durkheim wrote, 'We must, therefore, consider social phenomena in themselves as distinct from the consciously formed representations of them in the mind'. He noted that Janet proved 'that many acts, while bearing all the signs of being conscious, are not in fact so'. Acts are thus both conscious and unconscious.
Meštrović has noted, 'Durkheim regarded social facts as a type of collective representation whose reality eludes the consciousness of agents, witnesses, and society itself'. What indeed are collective representations, how are they related to archetypes, and why is a knowledge of both essential to a transpersonalsociology of religion?
In exploring the concepts of collective representations and archetypes, we may first assume that the unconscious plays a key role. Ambiguity remains an ever-present factor, since we can never fully know another’s motives or even our own. We may observe the manifestations of the unconscious, as Durkheim pointed out, through social facts, or as Jung pointed out, through the process of symbol-formation. Second, we can examinethe words that Durkheim and Jung used to describe collective representations and archetypes.
Consider,for example, Durkheim’s statement that representations are 'partially autonomous realities with . . . the power to attract and repel each other'. Collective representations are thus characterized by a synthetic process. This process, embodying the psycho-sociological aspect of the transpersonal, creates sui generis social forces from the association of private sentiments.
As Durkheim later noted, mythologies provide a source of religious beliefs, or representations, which leave 'an indelible trace' and which illustrate the most fundamental and collective aspects of a society. He identified these collective representations as: the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well: to make them a multitude of minds have associated, United and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge.
As Durkheim later noted, mythologies provide a source of religious beliefs, or representations, which leave 'an indelible trace' and which illustrate the most fundamental and collective aspects of a society. He identified these collective representations as: the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well: to make them a multitude of minds have associated, United and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge.
This accumulated knowledge resulting in religious collective representations is also implicit in Jung’s description of archetypes. Compare Durkheim’s statement with Jung’s description: Archetypal statements are based upon instinctive preconditions. . . . They have always been part of the world scene—representations collectives, as Levy Bruhl rightly called them. . . . Practical consideration of these processes is the essence of religion, insofar as religion can be approached from a psychological point of view.
Jung further stated, 'It is a psychological fact that the archetype can seize hold of the ego and compel it to act as the archetype wills.' Commonality with Durkheim seems obvious, as both describe a similar phenomenon. Jung echoed Durkheim’s description of the synthetic process of forming collective representations when he stated that the symbols of the collective unconscious, to be understood on an individual level, must be 'subjected to a synthetic mode of treatment'.
Jung further stated, 'It is a psychological fact that the archetype can seize hold of the ego and compel it to act as the archetype wills.' Commonality with Durkheim seems obvious, as both describe a similar phenomenon. Jung echoed Durkheim’s description of the synthetic process of forming collective representations when he stated that the symbols of the collective unconscious, to be understood on an individual level, must be 'subjected to a synthetic mode of treatment'.
Specifically, the synthetic mode of treatment requires the opposing states of the psyche to 'face one another in the fullest conscious opposition . . . while the ego is forced to acknowledge its absolute participation in both'. Such work activates the 'transcendent function', which brings about a middle ground where the opposites can be united. Since the psyche contains the constant dynamic of tension between opposites, their 'union' signifies conscious awareness, inasmuch as possible, of unconscious material. This description clearly illustrates the social-psychological aspects of a transpersonal perspective.
Jung’s description of psychological facts resembles Durkheim’s social facts or collective representations. Durkheim, in discussing the basis for collective representations, wrote that psychic phenomena 'make themselves apparent by their characteristic signs of . . . hesitation [and] tentativeness'. His words bear an uncanny resemblance to those of Jung, who stated that unconscious factors, or archetypes, can cause reactions to be 'delayed, altered, suppressed, or replaced by autonomous intruders'. Both collective representations and archetypes contain unconscious factors so that they can never be known in entirety to humans. Both exert a compulsion upon humans and affect behavior in bizarre ways.
Further explanation lies in Jung’s suggestion that the self prefigures the 'God within us,' since the self represents a psychological concept expressing an unknowable essence which can 'thwart our will . . . obsess our consciousness . . . and . . . influence our moods and action'. Jung echoes Durkheim’s emphasis on the divine as social necessity by admonishing us not to leave out the divine when considering autonomous contents, since the divine is a psychological necessity. By affixing the attribute 'divine' to the workings of autonomous contents, we are admitting their relatively superior force.
In tracing the historical usage of the concept of archetypes, Jung described archetypes as 'universal images that have existed since the remotest times' similar to Platonic forms. He cited Levy-Bruhl’s representations collectives, as well as Hubert’s and Mauss’s categories of the imagination. In addition, he listed Usener’s unconscious thinking, Bastian’s elementary ideas, Kant’s doctrine of categories, St. Augustine’s ideae principales, and Philo Judaeus’s and Irenaeus’s Imago Dei (God-image). The Corpus Hermeticum’s God is archetypal light. Jung also observed that the familiar characters in fairy tales, such as the witch or the trickster, represent archetypes. Thus Durkheim’s collective representations and Jung’s archetypes appear to possess a similar conceptual foundation. Although Durkheim’s use of collective representations has generally been dropped in favor of 'social facts,' we must remember that the category of collective representations subsumes social facts, including their psychological, subjective dimension.
Collective representations manifest themselves especially in religions and in mythologies containing 'vast systems of representations' which 'far from being engraven through all eternity upon the mental constitution of men . . . depend, at least in part, upon factors that are historical and consequently social'. Durkheim’s collective representations appear to have their origins in distant time, but because of their synthetic nature and ability to form and reform, specific collective representations exert a time-limited effect upon humans. Yet this effect may exhibit great power, a power in part due to unconscious factors.
Again, let us remember that collective representations, while unfamiliar to modern day sociologists, was a commonplace term in fin de siecle society. Jung explained that collective representations, described by Levy-Bruhl in primitive tribal lore, have been modified from unconscious to 'conscious formulae . . . generally in the form of esoteric teaching. This last is a typical means of expression for the transmission of collective contents originally derived from the unconscious'. As with Durkheim, ambiguity appears in this statement as we attempt to determine the similarities between Jung’s archetypes and Durkheim’s collective representations.
Through the preceding comparative analysis, I conclude that Durkheim and Jung are indeed describing the same process [...]"
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